'Hamburger Hill Essay\r'

'The entire view is a rugged, uninviting wilderness blanketed in double- and triple-canopy jungle, dense thickets of bamboo, and waist-high elephant grass. Local Montagnard tribesmen called Ap Bia â€Å"the mountain of the crouching beast. ” LTC Weldon Honeycutt, commander of the 3d Battalion, 187th infantry (the â€Å"Rakkasans”), called it â€Å"Hill 937. ” The Soldiers who fought there dubbed it â€Å"beefburger Hill. ” The ? ght on Hamburger Hill occurred during Operation Apache Snow, the second part of a terzetto-phased campaign intended to destroy North Vietnam host (NVA) bases in the treacherous A Shau Valley.\r\nThe American and second Vietnamese units participating in Apache Snow knew, ground on existing intelligence service and previous experiences in the A Shau, that they were in for a tough ? ght. beyond that, however, they had little evidence as to the resistance’s actual strength and dispositions. Masters of camou? age, the N VA completely conceal their bases from aerial surveillance. When the NVA moved, they did so at darkness along trails covered by triple-canopy jungle, again confounding nonice from above.\r\nThey effected their command and control mainly by runner and wire, leaving no electronic pinch for the Americans to monitor or trace. Technology, therefore, provided scant assistance to the American battalion commander trying to â€Å"see the enemy” during Apache Snow. He had to generate his own tacticalintelligence. Patrols, captured equipment, installations, documents, and occasionally prisoners provided conflict commanders with the raw data from which to draw their assessment of the enemy order of battle and dispositions. Gathering this information took time, though.\r\nMoreover, intelligence about the enemy’s strength and dispositions did not necessarily illuminate his commander’s intent. It took long time to ascertain this, and the learning experience proved by a ll odds unpleasant for the Americans. On 11 May, Honeycutt dispersed his Rakkasans and seek the vicinity to the north and northwest of Ap Bia Mountain. When Bravo confederation made heavy contact with some NVA latterly in the day, Honeycutt adjusted his come close of the enemy’s strength from â€Å"a few trail watchers” to a reinforced platoon or even a keep company.\r\nThe Rakkasans could mum deal with a force that size, but they would contrive to concentrate to do so. For the next three days, Honeycutt fought the mountain and the NVA to bring his scattered companies together for a matching battalion attack. Despite the fact that, since the initial assault, no company was more than about 1, euchre meters from the crest of the mountain, it took dickens days to consolidate the battalion for a three-company assault.\r\n meter and again, the American infantrymen found themselves hampered as much by the topography as by the enemy. The rugged terrain slowed dismoun ted movement to a crawl. Between 12 and 14 May, for example, Delta Company was approximately immobilized when it went down a steep ravine and was caught there by the enemy. In one grueling ? ve-hour period, the company threatening to advance a total of only 500 meters. The steep, mud-covered slopes, more than the enemy, kept this company from ful? lling Honeycutt’s intent.\r\nIn the end, the troops had to abandon their attack and withdraw the direction they had come. These three days were a period of intensely unpleasant â€Å"discovery learning” for Honeycutt and his men. Map reconnaissance and helicopter over-? ights did not indicate that his initial organisation of maneuver was impractical. It took Delta Company’s three-day ordeal to do so. Though Honeycutt had a long and distinguished platter as a combat commander in both Vietnam and Korea, he underestimated Ap Bia Mountain and the NVA facing him.\r\nAlthough his estimate of the enemy strength was incor rect, his miscalculation was not directly apparent to him or to any of the American leadership. It took three days of assaults by Bravo and Charlie Companies, each bloodily repulsed, before the situation became clearer. The enemy was stronger than anticipated, much stronger than company strength, and he grew more powerful every night as he received reinforcements from Laos. The NVA commander’s demonstrated tenacity and willingness to replace heavy losses indicated he intended to put up a stiff ? ght for Hill 937 (Scalard).\r\n'